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CONCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: COMMENTARY ON
DIXON
James Stellios*
It is an understandable reflex that, in the face of doctrinal uncertainty and instability, the
High Court would retreat to the text of the Constitution. That has been the case in relation
to two controversial doctrines recognised over the last 25 years. In Lange v Australian
Broadcasting Corporation,1 a unanimous Court emphasised the need to ground the
implied freedom of political communication in the text of the Constitution. This
exceptional showing of unanimity followed a period of doctrinal instability and wide
critique of the legitimacy of ilposing this implied limitation on the political arms of
government. Similarly, the Kable2 limitation largely began its life as an implication from
the general scheme in Chapter III for the exercise of Commonwealth judicial power. Its
revival as an effective and workable doctrine 3 has coincided with a common
reformulation that anchors it in the essential characteristics of State 'courts' which can
be, and have been, vested with federal jurisdiction to exercise Commonwealth judicial
power.4
While grounding these limitations in the text might be seen as adding legitimacy to
the interpretive technique, it comes at a cost. The text reveals very little to assist in
determining the mechanics of how the limitations are to operate. This is not a new or
surprising problem. Other implied limitations have long suffered from imprecision of
definition, scope and purpose, including the federal separation of judicial power
principles.
The anchoring of these doctrines in the text of the Constitution arguably disguised the
real concern with these new limitations: that is, the greater role for the judiciary in
protecting the liberty of the individual from an exercise of sovereign power. Traces of
this residue can be seen in the continuing rejection of the idea that the implied freedom
of political communication protects an individual right5 and the elevation of concerns
for institutional integrity in the Kable doctrine over the protection of individual liberty.
Associate Professor, Australian National University; Barrister, NSW Bar.
1 (1997) 189 CLR 520.
2 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51.
3 As to which see James Stellios, Zines's The High Court and the Constitution (6th ed, Federation
Press, 2015) 280-294.
4 See, eg, Attorney-General (NT) v Emmerson (2014) 253 CLR 393, 426 [44].
5 See most recently McCloy v New South Wales [2015] HCA 34, [29] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell
and Keane JJ); [149]-[150] (Gageler J); [247] (Nettle J); [318] (Gordon J).
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It is here that Professor Dixon's functionalism adds great value to the interpretive
exercise. A functional approach to constitutional reasoning, with its search for
constitutional values and consequences, provides enormous potential for transparent
engagement with constitutional meaning. However, the exercise must be contained,
otherwise it runs the risk of either permitting an undisciplined resort to a range of extra-
constitutional values or forcing a retreat to the bare text for an answer.
In this comment, I suggest that Professor Dixon's methodology requires a conception
of the role of the judiciary within the constitutional system. In particular, it needs a clear
conception of the role of the judiciary to protect the individual against an exercise of
sovereign power. Without such a conception (or conceptions), functionalism can easily
slide into pragmatism or policy-oriented legal reasoning. The point can be illustrated in
the context of two well-established constitutional values: federalism and separation of
judicial power; and in their convergence in the Kable principle.
I FEDERALISM
It is, of course, well known that, prior to the Engineers' case, 6 the High Court took a more
active role in designing federalism in Australia. The early federalism doctrines - reserve
powers in particular - allowed the Court considerable scope to determine which political
process - federal or State - could pursue its policy agenda within particular areas of
regulation. The intrusive role of the Court was radically transformed by the decision in
Engineers' which placed federalism questions largely in the hands of the federal political
process which remained continuously accountable to the federal electorate. Engineers'
was much more than a case about conceptions of federalism: it was a fundamental
statement about the relationship between the judiciary and the political arms of
government. Well before his Honour's appointment to the High Court, Gageler J
recognised this constitutional dynamic in an influential 1987 article:
'... the judgment [in Engineers'] is properly read as being consistent with the understanding
that the central conception of responsible government - the political process acting as a
mechanism of constitutional constraint - is capable of application to issues of federalism
and that the political process should be given primacy in the Australian Constitution,
judicial review playing a subsidiary role. In other words, it is the political process and not
the judiciary which should be predominant'. 7
In simple terms, and in marked contrast to the pre-Engineers' period, judicial review
was now to take a back seat to the political process on questions of the appropriate
federal balance.
Without this conception of judicial review, a functionalist lens might lead us astray,
losing us in a quagmire of centripetal and centrifugal federalism debates. Local
experimentation or democracy, having government closer to local communities, or
accommodating pluralism might, for example, support an argument that same sex
marriage falls outside federal power. Contrastingly, arguments directed to uniform
outcomes for all personal relationships might be accepted, and indeed were accepted by
the Court in the Marriage Equality Act case,8 as justifying an expansive reading of the
6 Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 129.
7 Stephen Gageler, 'Foundations of Australian Federalism and the Role of Judicial Review'
(1987) 17 Federal Law Review 162, 164.
8 Commonwealth v Australian Capital Territory (2013) 250 CLR 441.
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word 'marriage' in s 51(xxi) of the Constitution.9 Similar competing federalism
arguments might be advanced in relation to the word 'benefit' in s 51(xxiiiA), the
meaning of which, as Professor Dixon explains, was addressed by the Court in Williams
v Commonwealth (No 2)10 without any functional lens at all. These federalism debates are
very engaging but arguably, following Engineers' are largely for federal political design
rather than for judicial review.
More problematic would be a functionalist view of federalism that saw it as a
mechanism for diffusing or disbursing power to protect the individual against arbitrary
exercises of sovereign power. Such a conception of federalism has a long history in
political theory and the constitutional context of other federal systems. While there has
been no strong tradition of this conception of federalism in High Court jurisprudence, it
is not unknown,11 and an unconstrained functionalist approach might open the door for
such analysis. Such concerns, however, would not arise if the exercise were conditioned
by an Engineers' conception of judicial review.
II SEPARATION OF JUDICIAL POWER
The separation of powers jurisprudence presents significant constitutional problems.
While the Constitution contains an allocation of powers across Chapters I, II and III, there
is no clear evidence that the framers thought very much about the idea of separating
power. As French CJ recognised in South Australia v Totani,1 2 '[t]he historical record does
not indicate that the members of the Convention expressly adverted to the broader
concept of the separation of judicial power in their debates.' Nor has the separate
identification of legislative and executive power across Chapters I and II been thought to
withstand the competing historical and constitutional imperative of responsible
government. 13 Yet, in the face of this history and competing constitutional principle, the
strength of the separation of judicial power principles remains. However, finding
consensus on a clear function to be performed by the separation of judicial power
principles remains elusive. Is it needed as a check on power, to protect the federal
compact, the rule of law, the liberty of the individual or, perhaps, a combination of these
objectives? If it is the protection of the individual, how is this protection achieved? Is it
through ensuring the proper working of representative and responsible government as
a mechanism for protecting rights; the power-dispersing effects of a separation of
powers; or the entrenchment of an Anglo-Australian conception of judicial power being
exercised by an independent judiciary to determine disputes between individuals or
individuals and the state?
These are important questions which have enormous doctrinal implications. The
division in the Court on indefinite detention 14 and the use of courts for preventative
9 Although the need for uniform regulation was seen in limited terms as required by the
demands of private international law: see Stellios, above n 3, 28.10 (2014) 252 CLR 416.
11 See New South Wales v Commonwealth (2006) 229 CLR 1, 245 [612]-[613] (Kirby J) ('Work
Choices case').
12 (2010) 242 CLR 1, 44 [63].
13 See R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia (1956) 94 CLR 254, 279-80
('Boilermakers' case').
14 See Stellios, above n 3, 315-19.
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detention 15 reflect underlying uncertainties about the function performed by a
separation of judicial power. While the Court and commentators (including myself)
have been largely content to rest the judicial separation principles on the baseline
imperative of maintaining judicial independence, much closing probing is required.
Professor Dixon's call for a functionalist approach accentuates the shortcomings of High
Court jurisprudence in this context. However, again, functionalism debates cannot be
undertaken in a vacuum. They necessarily require a conception of the role of judicial
review, in particular, the role of the court in the constitutional system for protecting the
individual.
III KABLE
To turn to one of the key areas considered in Professor Dixon's article, the Kable principle
lies at the interface between the separation of powers and federalism. It is a 'doctrine of
federalism' 16 - it exists only by virtue of the integrated federal judicial system. However,
its core justification draws from the exercise or potential exercise of Commonwealth
judicial power by State courts, with the concept of Commonwealth judicial power
having already been disciplined by separation of judicial power principles. Thus, we see
indecision in the Kable cases as to what drives its operation: is it institutional integrity to
protect the federal system, protection of liberty or something else? Professor Dixon's
functionalism might assist here to expose these imponderables. Again, however, such
an exercise necessarily requires a conception of judicial review.
IV CONCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The central point emphasised so far is that Professor Dixon's functionalism has great
value. It presses us - courts and commentators - to think more precisely about the
function performed by constitutional provisions, structures and implications. However,
I have also emphasised that such an approach needs to be contained and conditioned by
conceptions of the role of judicial review, in particular, in terms of rights-protection.
Gageler J has recently sought to provide a broad, coherent vision of the place of
judicial review within the federal constitutional system. In McCloy v New South Wales, 17
his Honour sought to justify the role, and calibrate the intensity, of judicial review
according to the demands and shortcomings of the federal political process. 'Electoral
choice', his Honour said, 'constitutes the principal constraint on the constitutional
exercise by the Parliament of the legislative power of the Commonwealth, and on the
lawful exercise by Ministers and officers within their departments of the executive
power of the Commonwealth'. 18 His Honour then justifies the role of the Court in
protecting the system of representative and responsible government because of the
inherent risks posed by the majoritarian character of the system itself.1 9
15 See James Stellios, 'Kable, Preventative Detention and the Dilemmas of Chapter III' (2014)
88 Australian Law Journal 52, esp 66.
16 Brendan Lim, 'Attributes and Attribution of State Courts - Federalism and the Kable
Principle' (2012) 40 Federal Law Review 31, 32.
17 [2015] HCA 34.
18 Ibid [111].
19 Ibid [114].
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Gageler J's exposition appears to build on his Honour's earlier thinking prior to his
appointment to the Court. 2U That earlier work is referred to by Professor Dixon as a way
of understanding the drawing of implications from the Constitution. Whether an
implication should be drawn from the text or structure, Professor Dixon says that 'a
functionalist approach would need to include an account of the underlying approach to
judicial, versus legislative, power under a particular constitutional order'. It would thus
be 'necessary to develop a more general account of the basic role or function of judicial
review itself under the Constitution'.
I agree, but I do not think it is limited to the drawing of implications. Although
Gageler J in McCloy applied this framework to justify the judiciary's role in protecting
representative and responsible government, it was not limited to implications in his
Honour's earlier academic writings: it also justified the expansive approach to federal
heads of legislative power and the operation of express limitations like s 92. Even if it
were limited to the drawing of implications, the need for a conception of judicial review
has a wide compass: the implied freedom of political communication, the separation of
judicial power principles and the Kable limitation.
A strict application of Gageler J's conception of judicial review would seem to allow
little role for judicial protection of the individual from the exercise of sovereign power.
The primacy of the federal political process would apply to questions of rights-
protection as much as to questions of federalism. Drawing from the observations of
Professor Harrison Moore, Gageler J noted in McCloy21 that '[t]he great underlying
principle is, that the rights of individuals are sufficiently secured by ensuring, as far as
possible, to each a share, and an equal share, in political power'. 22 Responsible
government, not judicial review, is the primary constitutional point of traction between
the individual and the state. Gageler J's conception of judicial review would certainly
support limitations that protect the Court's role in exercising judicial review to control
federal power, but those limitations would be targeted at preserving the judiciary's
insulation from the other arms of government in order to perform that function: that is,
the separation of judicial power and Kable baseline.
That, however, does not necessarily rule out other, overlapping conceptions of
judicial review. The constitutional entrenchment of a separated and insulated judicial
power might not just be seen as important for policing federal power. In Al-Kateb v
Godwin,23 Gummow J pointed to the statement by Scalia J in Hamdi v Rumsfeld, that [t]he
very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon system of separated powers has been
freedom from indefinite imprisonment at the will of the executive'. 24 In other words, it
is the very essence of judicial power, according to British constitutional tradition, to
protect liberty by resolving disputes between the individual and the state, and that role
has been entrenched within our constitutional system. Such a conception of judicial
review would give greater support to the emphasis within separation of judicial power
and Kable jurisprudence to the judiciary's role in protecting liberty. Yet, given the Court's
20 Stephen Gageler, 'Beyond the Text: A Vision of the Structure and Function of the
Constitution' (2009) 32 Australian Bar Review 138; Gageler, above n 8.
21 [2015] HCA 34, [110].
22 W Harrison Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (Legal Books, 1902) 329.
23 (2004) 219 CLR 562.
24 Ibid 612 [137].
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jurisprudence on indefinite detention and court ordered preventative detention, it is far
from clear that such a conception would enjoy majority support.
The great value in Professor Dixon's functionalist approach is that it presses the
Court and commentators to flush out these underlying disagreements and uncertainties.
